Family and Funds

Figures converted from Indonesian rupiah at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.

Family and Funds

The unrealized marks that supply roughly a third of PBSA's pretax profit sit almost entirely in funds carrying the Nusadana name — and the people who ultimately own PBSA, and who sign its accounts, personally ran the Nusadana investment group before joining the company. PBSA discloses the $19.7M portfolio as a third-party holding, and the historical roles ended between 2008 and 2013. But ownership of the company and the valuation of those funds run through the same few people, which the "third party" label alone does not convey.

Who ultimately owns PBSA

Two private holding companies own 83.72% of PBSA: PT Ascend Bangun Persada (46.16%) and PT Sigma Mutiara (37.56%), with a 16.28% public float [1]. The FY2025 annual report names the ultimate beneficial owners plainly: Erwin Tanuwidjaja and Yonggi Tanuwidjaja [2].

The 2016 IPO prospectus shows the chain in full. At listing, PT Ascend Bangun Persada was owned 85% by Yonggi Tanuwidjaja and 15% by Halim Susanto; PT Sigma Mutiara was held entirely by the Tanuwidjaja family and their vehicles — Inge Setyawati Tanuwidjaja, Erwin Tanuwidjaja, Yonggi Tanuwidjaja, PT Paramita Adhi Perkasa and PT Nuansa Indah Kreasi (itself 98% Yonggi Tanuwidjaja) [3]. By FY2025 an intermediate vehicle, PT Infiniti Investama (98.67% Halim Susanto), had been inserted above Ascend, but the beneficial ownership remained the same family group [4]. This is the ownership that directs both the dividend and the securities book examined in Capital and Control.

The same hands ran the fund manager

The distinctive fact is not the ownership concentration — Capital and Control covered that — but where these same individuals worked before PBSA. The company's own board biographies disclose it:

Sources: FY2025 Annual Report, Board of Directors profile [5] and Board of Commissioners profile [6]; 2016 IPO Prospectus, management profiles [7].

Yonggi Tanuwidjaja — one of the two named ultimate owners — was President Director of PT Nusadana Capital Indonesia from 2005 to 2008 and a commissioner of the affiliated securities house [8]. Evelyn Tanuwidjaja, PBSA's Finance Director and a family affiliate of the ultimate owners, was Finance Director of the same Nusadana Capital entity [9]. Halim Susanto, the President Commissioner, ran the OSK Nusadana securities business and chaired the Nusadana Capital board [10]. The finance director who signs off on the portfolio's carrying value, in other words, came from the manager of the funds that dominate it.

Where the money actually sits

At 31 December 2025 the $19.7M short-term investment book was 82.9% concentrated in three Nusadana-branded funds, with a fourth manager-run fund (Juara Capital) taking most of the rest. Only $0.05M — a single listed share, PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper — carried an observable exchange price. The other 99.7% is valued at net asset values published by the fund managers themselves [11].

Source: FY2025 Annual Report, Note 11 Short-term Investments (holdings as at 31 Dec 2025) [12].

The valuation basis matters because the marks move sharply. KPD Nusadana was carried at $0.152 per unit at end-2025 against $0.055 a year earlier — a 186.7% gain on an unchanged 46,255,167 units, lifting that single line from $2.5M to $7.0M without a dollar of new money [13]. The mechanics of that mark, and its weight in reported profit, are the subject of Earnings Quality; the point here is who published the number.

Source: derived from FY2025 Annual Report, Note 11 ($16.3M of $19.7M Nusadana-branded; $0.05M at an exchange price) [14].

What the "third party" label does and does not settle

PBSA classifies the entire portfolio as a third-party holding, and the funds appear nowhere in the related-party note (Note 30), which lists only key-management compensation of $0.25M [15]. The units are held through independent custodian banks — PT Bank Danamon and Bank BJB — not by a connected entity [16]. The disclosed Nusadana roles all ended more than a decade ago, and nothing in the corpus shows the family currently owns or controls the funds' manager. On the evidence available, this is not proven related-party dealing.

What it is: a concentration of trust that the accounting treatment obscures. A third of pretax profit, and about 35% of equity, rests on net asset values published by an investment group that three of PBSA's senior insiders — including a named ultimate owner and the sitting finance director — once ran, and those values are self-certified rather than struck against a market. A genuinely arm's-length third party and a former employer are both "third parties" in the note; only one of them raises the question of whether the mark and the marker are independent.

The reading that would flip this from a governance flag to a related-party finding is direct evidence that the Tanuwidjaja or Susanto interests currently hold or control the Nusadana fund manager — a registry fact the filings do not carry and this run could not retrieve. The reading that would defuse it is a clean redemption: units sold to the custodian bank at the carried NAV, converting a manager's mark into cash. Q1 FY2026 offered a partial, unhelpful test — the portfolio was marked down $4.0M in a single quarter, and $2.8M was sold to bridge a cash shortfall (Sum-of-the-Parts) — which shows the marks are at least two-directional, but not that the up-marks clear at book. Until a redemption does, the safest treatment is to value the Nusadana stack at a discount to its published NAV, exactly as Sum-of-the-Parts does when it strips the portfolio out of the construction valuation.